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WHY DATA PRIVACY LAW IS (MOSTLY) CONSTITUTIONAL
NEIL M. RICHARDS*
ABSTRACT
Laws regulating the collection, use, and disclosure of personal
data are (mostly) constitutional, and critics who suggest otherwise
are wrong. Since the New Deal, American law has rested on the wise
judgment that, by and large, commercial regulation should be made
on the basis of economic and social policy, rather than blunt constitu-
tional rules. This has become one of the basic principles of American
constitutional law. Although some observers have suggested that the
United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Sorrell v. IMS
Health Inc. changes this state of affairs, such readings are incorrect.
Sorrell involved a challenge to a poorly drafted Vermont law that
discriminated on the basis of both content and viewpoint. Such a law
would have been unconstitutional if it had regulated even unpro-
tected speech. As the Sorrell Court made clear, the real problem with
the Vermont law at issue was that it did not regulate enough, unlike
the “more coherent policy” of the undoubtedly constitutional federal
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996.
Data privacy law should thus rarely be thought of as implicating
serious constitutional difficulties, and this is a good thing. As we
move into the digital age, in which more and more of our society is
affected or constituted by data flows, we face a similar threat. If
“data” were somehow “speech,” virtually every economic law would
become clouded by constitutional doubt. Economic or commercial
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policy affecting data flows—which is to say all economic or social
policy—would become almost impossible. This might be a valid
policy choice, but it is not one that the First Amendment commands.
Any radical suggestions to the contrary are unsupported by our
constitutional law. In a democratic society, the basic contours of
information policy must ultimately be up to the people and their
policy-making representatives, and not to unelected judges. We
should decide policy on that basis, rather than on odd readings of the
First Amendment.
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INTRODUCTION
Privacy and free speech are siblings with a long and complicated
relationship. Both have a common parent in Justice Louis Brandeis,
and for over a century they have developed together. Like siblings,
they have sometimes bickered, but as they have matured they have
often gone their own ways. Privacy and free speech can each mean
many things, so we should not be surprised that this is the case.1
Although both privacy and free speech are products of earlier
centuries, we now live in an age of personal information. Such
personal information drives the economy and can be used to influ-
ence policy, our elections,2 our identities,3 and even our moods.4 This
is the case whether we call it “personal information” or the currently
fashionable buzzword “big data.” Whatever we call it, information
is power. That power is neither inherently good nor inherently bad;
it is merely a social reality that we have to live with.5
Democratic societies usually regulate complex social realities. We
have laws dealing with industrialization and pollution, with market
capitalism and fraud, and with social equality and racism. Although
social norms and practices remain important, complex social real-
ities are also typically a subject for law and legal regulation.
Nevertheless, sometimes we decide that democratic regulation is too
dangerous, even for complex social problems. Thus, most democratic
societies deny themselves the power to police the field of public
debate or the marital choices of consenting adults. In the United
1. See Neil M. Richards, The Puzzle of Brandeis, Privacy, and Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV.
1295, 1343 (2010).
2. See Sasha Issenberg, A More Perfect Union: How President Obama’s Campaign Used
Big Data to Rally Individual Voters, MIT TECH. REV. (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.technology
review.com/featuredstory/509026/how-obamas-team-used-big-data-to-rally-individual-voters/
[http://perma.cc/5C69-ZJF6].
3. See Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Three Paradoxes of Big Data, 66 STAN. L.
REV. ONLINE 41, 43-44 (2013) http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/online/
topics/66_StanLRevOnline_41_RichardsKing.pdf [http://perma.cc/SFU5-CGSC].
4. Journal That Published Facebook Mood Study Expresses “Concern” at Its Ethics,
GUARDIAN (July 3, 2014, 9:10 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jul/04/
journal-published-facebook-mood-study-expresses-concern-ethics [http://perma.cc/TY5R-
HY58].
5. Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393,
395, 432 (2014).
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States—in sharp contrast to the rest of the world—issues of
campaign finance and market power,6 hate speech and equality,7
and, increasingly, gun possession and violence8 seem to be entering
this category of “too dangerous to regulate.” We lawyers typically
call such laws “unconstitutional,” finding that they violate some
provision of the Constitution, such as the First, Second, or Four-
teenth Amendments.
My goal in this Article is to explain why regulation of the
commercial trade in personal data will be consistent with the First
Amendment, at least most of the time. Blanket assertions that regu-
lation of personal information flows threatens freedom of expression
misunderstand either the nature of data privacy law, the nature of
First Amendment rights, or both. A few kinds of privacy rights
certainly run into conflict with the First Amendment, most notably
the old Warren and Brandeis argument for a tort by which the rich
and famous could keep unflattering and embarrassing truths about
themselves out of the newspapers.9 But privacy can mean many
things, and most of these things are fully consistent with the
American commitments to the broad rights of freedom of speech and
press. Our laws use the term “privacy” to refer to the many laws
regulating personal data, including consumer credit and video
rental information and information given to doctors and lawyers.
Despite calls from industry groups and a few isolated academics
that these laws somehow menace free public debate, the vast
majority of information privacy law is constitutional under ordinary
settled understandings of the First Amendment.10 Policymakers can
6. See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442 (2014) (holding that a law
imposing aggregate limits on individuals’ campaign contributions violated the First
Amendment); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365-66 (2010) (holding that the govern-
ment cannot suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity and
striking down portions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 restricting corporate
expenditures for electioneering communications as unconstitutional).
7. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (striking down a hate
crime statute because it discriminated against racist viewpoints and thus violated the First
Amendment).
8. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (holding that a ban
on possession of handguns in the home violated the Second Amendment).
9. See infra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
10. See Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA
L. REV. 1149, 1155 (2005) (“[W]hen the First Amendment and privacy have come into conflict
in the past, ... the First Amendment has universally triumphed.”).
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thus make information policy on the merits rather than being dis-
tracted by spurious free speech claims.
Throughout the world, democratic societies regulate personal data
using laws that embody the “Fair Information Practices” or FIPs.
The FIPs are a set of principles that regulate the relationships be-
tween business and government entities that collect, use, and dis-
close personal information about “data subjects,” and which were
developed by the United States government in the 1970s.11 Over the
past decade, some—but not all—industry groups and a handful of
scholars have argued that the FIPs somehow offend the First
Amendment.12 This is an argument seemingly strengthened by the
Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., which
struck down a Vermont law preventing drug company representa-
tives—but no one else—from using data-based marketing to speak
to physicians.13
Before Sorrell, there was a settled understanding that general
commercial regulation of the huge data trade was not censorship.
On the contrary, it was seen as part of the ordinary business of
commercial regulation that fills thousands of pages of the United
States Code and the Code of Federal Regulations. Nothing in the
Sorrell opinion should lead policymakers to conclude that this set-
tled understanding has changed. The poorly drafted Vermont law in
Sorrell discriminated against particular kinds of protected speech
(in-person advertising) and particular kinds of protected speakers
(advertisers but not their opponents).14 Such content- and viewpoint-
based discrimination would doom even unprotected speech under
well-settled First Amendment law. As the Court made clear, the
real problem with the Vermont law at issue was that it did not regu-
late enough, unlike the “more coherent policy” of the undoubtedly
11. See generally SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYS., U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS
(1973).
12. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling
Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1115-
17 (2000).
13. 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011).
14. Id. at 2660.
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constitutional federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountabil-
ity Act of 1996.15
Notwithstanding the Court’s clarity on this point, a few observers
have suggested that data flows are somehow “speech” protected by
the First Amendment. But the “data is speech” argument makes no
sense from a First Amendment perspective. People do things with
words every day that are clearly “speech”: from blogging and singing
in the shower, to insider trading, sexually harassing coworkers,
verbally abusing children, and even hiring assassins. Well-settled
First Amendment doctrine allows us to separate out which of these
activities cannot be regulated (the first two) from those which can
(the rest).16 First Amendment lawyers do not ask whether some-
thing is “speech,” because almost everything is expressive in some
way. Instead, they ask which kinds of government regulation are
particularly threatening to longstanding First Amendment values.
The question is not the “speechiness” of the human activity being
regulated, but the purpose and effect of the government regulation.
When we look at the regulation of commercial data flows from this
basic, unobjectionable premise of First Amendment law, we see that
such regulations will rarely be problematic. Commercial regula-
tion—of sexual harassment, unfair trade practices, and commercial
data flows based on the FIPs—is thus rarely threatening to First
Amendment values, properly understood by their settled meaning.
A more fundamental reason supports this conclusion as well.
During the New Deal, American society decided that, by and large,
commercial regulation should be made on the basis of economic and
social policy rather than blunt constitutional rules.17 This has be-
come one of the basic principles of American constitutional law. As
we move into the digital age, in which data flows affect or even
constitute more and more of our society, we face a similar threat. If
“data” were somehow “speech,” and this had First Amendment con-
sequences, constitutional doubt would cloud virtually every form of
economic regulation we have. Economic or commercial policy affec-
ting data flows, which is to say all economic or social policy, would
15. Id. at 2668 (quoting Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n. v. United States, 527 U.S.
173, 195 (1999)).
16. See infra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 130-34.
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become almost impossible. This might turn out to be a valid policy
choice, but it is not one that the First Amendment as we have un-
derstood it until now commands. Any radical suggestions to the con-
trary are unsupported by our constitutional law. Indeed, they are an
attempt to make radical changes to the basic contours of that law.
Privacy law is thus (mostly) constitutional. And when we are
talking about the regulation of commercial data flows, it is entirely
constitutional, except for a few poorly drafted outliers, such as the
law struck down in Sorrell. In a democratic society, the basic con-
tours of information policy must ultimately be up to the people and
their policy-making representatives, and not to unelected judges.
We should decide policy on that basis, rather than on odd readings
of the First Amendment.
I. TWO KINDS OF PRIVACY RIGHTS
Privacy as a concept has proven notoriously hard to define. This
is not because privacy is unimportant. On the contrary, it is the
importance of privacy as a value that has caused us to add many
different and sometimes contradictory meanings to the term. One
leading conceptual work on the subject, for example, defines privacy
as having sixteen different dimensions.18 Although there are many
different ways to describe things we might want to label as “pri-
vate,” when it comes to legal questions of privacy and free expres-
sion, two kinds of privacy matter the most. 
The first kind of privacy is tort privacy. This is the classic
formulation of privacy as a right to prevent speakers, usually the
press, from publishing true but embarrassing facts on the grounds
that they cause emotional harm or distress.19 This is the classic
argument from Warren and Brandeis’s 1890 article The Right to
Privacy, codified into American tort law by the work of the emi-
nent torts scholar William Prosser from the 1940s through the
1970s.20 In prior work, I have argued that the classic notion of
18. See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY (2008) (proposing a
“taxonomy” of privacy encompassing sixteen categories illustrating privacy problems).
19. Neil M. Richards, The Limits of Tort Privacy, 9 J. ON TELECOMMS. & HIGH TECH. L.
357, 359-60 (2011).
20. Id. at 363-64.
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privacy—Warren and Brandeis’s disclosure tort against the
press—is largely inconsistent with the First Amendment as we
understand it today. The main problem with the tort is the form its
regulation takes: it targets the press for publishing the embarrass-
ing truth under a blurry standard. In a post-New York Times v.
Sullivan era, punishing the press for publishing newsworthy truth
is at the core of what the First Amendment should protect, and
appropriately so.21 
But privacy can mean many things beyond the right to prevent
the press from making embarrassing disclosures about us. In fact,
given its First Amendment problems, the tort form of privacy that
protects us against embarrassing but true disclosures is likely to
have limited utility outside the problem of “revenge porn” or noncon-
sensual pornography. Increasingly, when we say “privacy” in a digi-
tal age, we are concerned not with publication by newspapers, but
rather with the collection, disclosure, and use of our personal in-
formation by known and unknown government and corporate
entities.22 We also use the term “privacy” to refer to the many laws
regulating personal data, including consumer credit and video
rental information, and information given to doctors and lawyers.23
Let us call this second kind of privacy “data privacy” to distinguish
it from tort privacy. Are these data privacy rules also unconstitu-
tional?
Throughout the world, democratic societies regulate personal data
using laws that embody the FIPs. The FIPs are one of the most
important concepts in privacy law. They are a set of principles that
regulate the relationships between business and government enti-
ties that collect, use, and disclose personal information about “data
subjects”—the ordinary people whose data is being collected and
used.24 Perhaps ironically, the FIPs were developed by the United
States government in the 1970s because the government wanted to
establish some minimal best practices for the processing of personal
data.25 The government report that announced the FIPs described
21. Id. at 368, 373-74.
22. Richards & King, supra note 5, at 410-11.
23. Id.
24. SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYS., supra note 11, at xxii-
xxiii.
25. Id.
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them as “five basic principles” to which automated data systems
must adhere:
There must be no personal data record-keeping systems
whose very existence is secret.
There must be a way for an individual to find out what
information about him is in a record and how it is used.
There must be a way for an individual to prevent information
about him that was obtained for one purpose from being used or
made available for other purposes without his consent.
There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a
record of identifiable information about him.
Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminat-
ing records of identifiable personal data must assure the
reliability of the data for their intended use and must take
precautions to prevent misuse of the data.26
The FIPs were embodied into law in the United States in the
Privacy Act and the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and then spread
throughout the world.27 They have different meanings in different
places and contexts, but at bottom the FIPs guarantee that data is
processed according to fair rules that give data subjects notice about
how their data is collected and used, and some choice about certain
uses of their data.28 They are the foundation of the Organization of
Economic Cooperation and Development’s privacy guidelines and
the basis for the European Union’s 1995 European Community
Directive on Data Protection, a framework governing data collection
and use in the European Union that requires EU member states to
adopt their own country-specific data protection laws.29 Joel
26. Id. at xx-xxi.
27. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a (2012)); Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 90-32, 84 Stat. 1128 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012)); Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the
Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn’t Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, ¶¶ 44-47 (2001),
https://journals.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/stanford-technology-law-review/
online/rotenberg-fair-info-practices.pdf [http://perma.cc/J3AA-R5Z5] (discussing how the
FIPs have “contributed to the development of privacy laws around the world and even to the
development of important international guidelines for privacy protection”).
28. See SEC’Y’S ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYS., supra note 11, at
xx-xxi.
29. DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 37-40 (4th ed.
2011).
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Reidenberg summarized the evolved FIPs as guaranteeing four
basic protections against data misuse: (1) standards for data quali-
ty, which ensure that data is acquired legitimately and is used in a
manner consistent with the purpose for which it was acquired; (2)
standards for transparency or openness of processing, such as giving
individuals meaningful notice regarding how their information is
being used; (3) special protections for sensitive data (for example,
race, sexual preference, political views, or telephone numbers
dialed), such as requiring opt-in consent before such data may be
used or disclosed; and (4) some standards of enforcement to ensure
compliance.30
The FIPs have been remarkably durable, but legislators have
proposed other principles from time to time. In January 2012, E.U.
regulators proposed revisions to the almost-twenty-year-old Data
Protection Directive.31 The most controversial of these was the
proposal of a new fair information principle, “Le Droit à l’Oubli,”
commonly translated into English as “The Right to Be Forgotten.”32
The right to be forgotten, which was popularized by Victor Mayer-
Schönberger in his 2009 book, Delete, is the idea that at some point,
personal data should be deleted, rather than persist in databases
forever.33 Implementation of this right into the FIPs could take
several forms. On one hand, it could be a somewhat innocuous gen-
eral requirement that data not last forever, like the requirements
in the Fair Credit Reporting Act or the Video Privacy Protection Act
that records from background checks or of movie watching be
destroyed as soon as is practicable.34 On the other hand, the right to
be forgotten could be interpreted as a right to have websites remove
30. Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Private
Sector, 80 IOWA L. REV. 497, 514-16 (1995).
31. Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, Commission Proposes a Comprehensive Reform of Data
Protection Rules to Increase Users’ Control of Their Data and to Cut Costs for Businesses
(Jan. 25, 2012), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-46_en.htm [http://perma.cc/X3NK-
EM9Y].
32. Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88, 88 (2012)
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/sites/default/files/online/topics/64-SLRO-88.pdf  [http://
perma.cc/T6GG-RVGT].
33. VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN THE DIGITAL
AGE, ix, 12-15, 198-99 (2009).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1681w (2012) (discussing the disposal of records in the consumer financial
information context); 18 U.S.C. § 2710(e) (2012) (discussing the destruction of old records in
the context of video tape rental or sale records).
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personal data, images, or news stories that a person thought viola-
ted their right to privacy. Under this view, the right to be forgotten
would turn the web into our own personal Wikipedia, giving us the
right to edit data about ourselves as we like. The version of the right
proposed by the European Union in 2012 seems to be of this latter,
stronger sort.35
Taking a step back, it is important to consider the constitutional
status of these rules—not just the right to be forgotten, but the FIPs
as a whole. These questions are some of the most important ques-
tions we face in our increasingly digital society, and they are the
ones I will examine in this Article. Do the FIPs restrict protected
free speech? If so, are they unconstitutional in whole or in part?
More generally, if Warren and Brandeis’s conception of privacy is
largely inconsistent with the First Amendment, what about rules
that regulate the disclosure of personal data in the marketplace?
Must we extend the First Amendment critique of privacy against
the press to all nondisclosures rules? Is privacy always a threat to
free speech?
My argument in this Article is that the answers to these ques-
tions should generally be “no.” Most data privacy regulations do not
involve the First Amendment because they do not restrict the flow
of data, much less the freedom of speech. Rules placing nondisclo-
sure obligations on data processors will rarely place burdens on
First Amendment values, especially if they are couched as confiden-
tiality rules. A few such rules, such as a broad view of the right to
be forgotten, might certainly threaten free speech, especially as they
come to look more like the disclosure tort. But in general, applying
the FIPs to databases and data processing of ordinary commercial
data is not censorship, and treating such rules as being outside the
central concern of the First Amendment is consistent with the better
reading of First Amendment law.
This conclusion is not just a better reading of the legal doctrine;
the question of whether data privacy rules censor free speech raises
the question of whether we can regulate data flows at all. In a
society in which data flows are becoming increasingly important,
35. CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., ON THE “RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN”: CHALLENGES AND
SUGGESTED CHANGES TO THE DATA PROTECTION REGULATION (2013), available at http://perma.
cc/U2J4-T3B8.
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this is akin to asking whether we can have commercial regulation
at all. Good policy, as well as our constitutional traditions of demo-
cratic self-government, counsel against a broad and dangerous
reading of the First Amendment that somehow equates “data” with
“speech.”
The best place to begin is with the FIPs. The FIPs are a code of
best practices for the handling of personal information by busi-
nesses and government.36 They can inform both the practices of
corporate and government entities, and also be embodied in
substantive legal rules. But statutes embodying the FIPs do far
more than merely regulating information flows or preventing
disclosures. Paul Schwartz has shown that under Reidenberg’s four-
part taxonomy of fair information practices, principle one, ensuring
data quality; principle two, ensuring transparency of processing;
and principle four, ensuring enforcement, simply have nothing to do
with speech under anyone’s definition.37 Only principle three, which
provides protection against the use or disclosure of sensitive data,
reflects the notion that information privacy prevents other people
from talking about you.38 Thus, even if you accept the idea that
nondisclosure rules create First Amendment problems, major forms
of information privacy protection envisioned by codes of fair
information practices and protected by current laws have nothing
whatsoever to do with the First Amendment.39
As for rules regulating disclosure of commercial data transfers,
the vast majority of these rules are consistent with the First
Amendment. The obligation that a university should keep its stu-
dents’ records confidential, for example, is very different from the
old Warren and Brandeis tort. It is one thing to gag the press in its
entirety from reporting on Mabel Warren’s dinner parties, and quite
another to require a university to keep its student records presump-
tively secret. This confidentiality rule does not target the press,
police an unwieldy line between public and private, or remedy
primarily emotional harm. Instead, the Family Educational Rights
and Privacy Act of 1974, the federal statute that imposes this
36. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
37. Paul M. Schwartz, Free Speech vs. Information Privacy: Eugene Volokh’s First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1559, 1561-62 (2000).
38. Id. at 1561-63.
39. Richards, supra note 10, at 1167-68.
1514 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:1501
confidentiality requirement, regulates the “education records” of a
university, carefully defines the records that are within its scope,
and governs the relationship between university and student.40
Other statutes embodying the FIPs operate similarly, and rather
than targeting news reports of celebrities, at their best the statutes
protect the confidentiality of the information we need to live our
lives, such as our library, medical, and financial records.41 Generally
applicable regulation of commercial data simply does not raise the
First Amendment concerns that the disclosure tort does,42 and confi-
dentiality rules that regulate the obligations of parties to a relation-
ship, rather than whether someone can publish a fact, pose even
fewer First Amendment problems.43
Not everyone agrees with me on this point, including some
technologists, academics, and corporate lobbyists. For example, in
an influential article, Eugene Volokh argues that most privacy rules
are inconsistent with free speech.44 Considering the various “codes
of fair information practices” imposed by law upon commercial
processors of personal data, Volokh asserts that “the right to infor-
mation privacy—my right to control your communication of
personally identifiable information about me—is a right to have the
government stop you from speaking about me.”45 He argues that
although private agreements to restrict speech are enforceable
under contract law, any broader, government-imposed code of fair
information practices that restricts the ability of speakers to
communicate truthful data about other people is inconsistent with
the most basic principles of the First Amendment.46 Although not all
free speech or privacy scholars agree with Volokh, his argument (or
ones like it) has been influential.47 Others have questioned the
constitutionality of something like the right to be forgotten, calling
40. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012).
41. See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x (2012) (discussing
consumer financial information); 45 C.F.R §§ 160-264 (2013) (discussing health privacy); MO.
REV. STAT. § 182.817 (2000) (providing an example of a representative state library privacy
statute).
42. See Richards, supra note 10, at 1194-1207.
43. Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 1650, 1660-63 (2009).
44. Volokh, supra note 12, at 1051.
45. Id. at 1050-51.
46. Id. at 1051.
47. See FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 68-71 (1997). 
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it, in the words of one excited commentator, “the biggest threat to
free speech on the Internet in the coming decade.”48
The Supreme Court has not been quite so enthusiastic about the
death of privacy. The Court has heard several cases pitting the dis-
closure tort or similar legal theories against First Amendment
claims by the press.49 Even though free speech has usually defeated
privacy in these cases, the Court’s tradition has been to move
carefully, refusing to rule categorically that claims by the press to
publish true material always trump privacy claims. The Court
explained this somewhat wordily in Bartnicki v. Vopper:
Our cases have carefully eschewed reaching this ultimate
question, mindful that the future may bring scenarios which
prudence counsels our not resolving anticipatorily.... We contin-
ue to believe that the sensitivity and significance of the interests
presented in clashes between [the] First Amendment and priva-
cy rights counsel relying on limited principles that sweep no
more broadly than the appropriate context of the instant case.50
In some of those other contexts, the Court has rejected claims that
other kinds of privacy violate the First Amendment. Trespass,
eavesdropping, wiretapping, stalking, and industrial espionage do
not receive special First Amendment protection;51 nor do profes-
sional duties of confidentiality like the attorney-client privilege, or
contractual agreements not to disclose information.52 Lawyers
cannot credibly argue that they have a First Amendment right to
divulge their client’s confidences,53 nor can reporters claim that the
First Amendment gives them the right to break agreements with
confidential sources that they will not disclose their identities.54
Similarly, restrictions on the sale of targeted marketing lists under
48. Rosen, supra note 32, at 88.
49. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 527-28 (2001); Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S.
524, 526 (1989); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1979); Okla. Publ’g Co.
v. Dist. Court, 430 U.S. 308, 311-12 (1977); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495-97
(1975).
50. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529 (quoting Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 532-33).
51. See generally Richards, supra note 10, at 1182-84 (collecting examples).
52. See id. at 1172-73.
53. Solove & Richards, supra note 43, at 1654, 1670.
54. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991).
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the Fair Credit Reporting Act have survived First Amendment
attack, with the Supreme Court declining to get involved.55
This traditional approach makes sense. Privacy and free speech
are both important human values, and it is important to tread care-
fully and not make overbroad claims about the death of privacy or
the absolute protection afforded to speech. Both privacy and free
speech claims can come in many guises and serve many different
interests, and blunt pronouncements in this area have the power to
cause significant harm. This is a complex issue, and it deserves a
nuanced solution. The First Amendment critique of privacy law is
strong when the privacy claims resemble the traditional Warren and
Brandeis argument for tort privacy.56 But that critique is much
weaker in other contexts, and it is hard to see how duties of confi-
dentiality—whether imposed on banks, attorneys, or even data
brokers—threaten First Amendment values. Under this traditional
approach, the law is in balance—privacy claims that menace a free
press are presumptively unconstitutional, but codes of fair informa-
tion practices, which are the foundation of data privacy law, and
professional duties of confidentiality are left intact.
Yet in 2011, the Supreme Court decided a case called Sorrell v.
IMS Health Inc., which some fear upset that balance in favor of
broad First Amendment protection against all privacy rules.57
Sorrell is the Court’s most recent word on whether the First Amend-
ment critique of privacy does, or should, apply to privacy law in the
data context. As such, the case is worth examining in some detail.
II. THE DATA BROKER CASE
IMS Health (IMS) provides personal data, analysis, and other
information services in the health care industry.58 In common
55. In Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 245 F.3d 809 (D.C. Cir. 2011), the Supreme Court
denied certiorari, although Justice Kennedy dissented. 536 U.S. 915, 916 (2002) (Kennedy,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). For another example, see Individual Reference Serv’s
Group, Inc. v. FTC, 145 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 2001), aff ’d sub nom. Trans Union LLC v. FTC,
295 F.3d 42 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
56. Richards, supra note 19, at 363-64.
57. 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
58. On its website, IMS declares itself “the world’s leading information, services and tech-
nology company dedicated to making healthcare perform better,” and a provider of “analytics
and proprietary application suites ... to enable our clients to run their operations more
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parlance, it is a data broker, a company that sells information and
answers to questions based on data. IMS is part of the so-called Big
Data revolution. Its business is to collect information, assemble it
into large databases, and mine it for insight by applying sophisti-
cated analytic techniques. IMS specializes in analyzing trends in
health care transactions so that the health companies that are its
customers have more information about the market, the competi-
tion, and the human beings seeking health care—that is, essentially
everyone.59 
One of the services that IMS and other data brokers provide is
data to support something called “detailing.”60 You may have noticed
representatives from pharmaceutical companies visiting your doctor.
These “drug reps” drop off free samples of drugs along with branded
pens and paper.61 More importantly, they are there to persuade your
doctor to prescribe their company’s drugs to you, rather than anoth-
er company’s drugs or no drugs at all. This direct marketing is
known in the trade as detailing, because drug reps give details
about their products to the doctors.62 Detailing does not merely rely
on the personal charm and persuasive power of the drug reps.
Instead, it relies on another kind of detail—large quantities of data
about what kinds of products to market to individual doctors. 
This is when IMS and other data brokers come into the story.
These companies buy prescription records from pharmacies in bulk
and use these records to assemble profiles of the prescribing pat-
terns of individual doctors.63 Drug reps can then detail those
doctors, knowing the habits of the doctor better than the doctor does
herself.64 Detailing is a massive industry that is both data- and
efficiently.” About IMS Health, IMSHEALTH, http://www.imshealth.com/portal/site/ imshealth
(follow “About IMS Health” hyperlink) [http://perma.cc/JH9P-BAGC] (last visited Mar. 24,
2015).
59. Id.
60. Rikin S. Mehta, Why Self-Regulation Does Not Work: Resolving Prescription Corrup-
tion Caused by Excessive Gift-Giving by Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
799, 799-802, 816 (2008) (discussing “pharmaceutical detailing” and “gifting” by which
pharmaceutical sales representatives will provide gifts in addition to selling pharmaceutical
drugs).
61. Id. at 799-802.
62. Id. at 801-02.
63. Christopher R. Smith, Somebody's Watching Me: Protecting Patient Privacy in
Prescription Health Information, 36 VT. L. REV. 931, 938-939 (2012).
64. Id. at 938-40.
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manpower-intensive.65 The multibillion dollar costs of detailing, like
advertising and other marketing costs, are ultimately passed on to
the patients who buy the drug prescribed by the doctor from their
pharmacy.66 The pharmacies then sell the new records to data bro-
kers, and the cycle continues.
Concerned about rising drug prices, Vermont and other New
England states passed laws designed to restrict the costly practice
of data-based detailing.67 They sought to drive down drug prices and
ensure that doctors made prescribing decisions on the basis of their
own independent judgment rather than data-based persuasion by
marketers. Vermont’s Prescription Confidentiality Act prohibited
pharmacies and health insurance companies from selling doctors’
prescription data for marketing purposes and prohibited drug reps
from using the data for marketing purposes, including detailing.68
IMS and other data brokers challenged the laws in court, arguing
that the regulations violated their corporate free-speech rights. The
First Circuit Court of Appeals upheld New Hampshire’s law in the
2008 case, IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte,69 but in the 2011 Sorrell case,
a deeply divided United States Supreme Court struck down the
Vermont law as unconstitutional.70
Writing for a majority of six Justices, Justice Kennedy concluded
that the Vermont law violated the First Amendment because it
restricted the speech of only marketers, and not of other speakers.71
As he put it succinctly, “The State has burdened a form of protected
expression that it found too persuasive. At the same time, the State
has left unburdened those speakers whose messages are in accord
with its own views. This the State cannot do.”72
In reaching this conclusion, the Court ruled that the “sale, dis-
closure, and use of prescriber-identifying information” was protected
by the First Amendment.73 Moreover, because the Prescription
65. Id. at 940-42.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 955-58.
68. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631 (2010).
69. 550 F.3d 42, 64 (1st Cir. 2008), abrogated by Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct.
2653 (2011).
70. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2672.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 2663.
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Confidentiality Act prohibited people from using the information for
marketing, the Court held that the Act “disfavor[ed] marketing, that
is, speech with a particular purpose. More than that, the statute dis-
favor[ed] specific speakers, namely pharmaceutical manufactur-
ers.”74 The Court’s logic was straightforward: because the sale of the
data was protected by the First Amendment, and its use for
marketing was prohibited, the statute created content- and view-
point-based restrictions on expression.75 Under settled First
Amendment law, content- and viewpoint-based discrimination are
presumptively unconstitutional.76 Because Vermont could not give
a sufficiently compelling reason to save the statute, it was invalid.
Two parts of this conclusion are significant. First, the principal
defect with the Prescription Confidentiality Act was its discrimina-
tion against certain kinds of protected speech and certain kinds of
protected speakers. This is a basic principle of First Amendment
law—discrimination among types of speech (content-based restric-
tion) is usually invalid.77 Most especially, discrimination against
particular speakers or messages (viewpoint-based restriction) is
almost always invalid.78 For example, in the famous case of R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul, the Court struck down a hate crime statute that
had been used to prosecute a man who had burned a cross on the
front lawn of an African-American family.79 The State can punish
cross burning of this sort using a variety of legal theories, including
threats, fighting words, and the intentional infliction of emotional
distress.80 Cross burning often falls under what First Amendment
parlance calls unprotected speech,81 but the St. Paul law targeted
only racist speech, and not the speech of toleration.82 It punished
racist cross burning, but not other kinds of cross burning, like in
Madonna’s infamous Like a Prayer music video. Because the law
discriminated on the basis of viewpoint by treating racist viewpoints
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992); Simon & Schuster, Inc.
v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115-16 (1991).
77. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. at 115.
78. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391.
79. Id. at 396.
80. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358-60 (2003).
81. See id. at 357-60.
82. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391-92.
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more harshly, it was unconstitutional.83 Thus, viewpoint discrimina-
tion against speech that was otherwise unprotected by the First
Amendment violated the First Amendment.84
In Sorrell, the Court reached the same conclusion, relying explic-
itly on R.A.V. because the Prescription Confidentiality Act banned
uses of the data in marketing communications, but not educational
ones.85 As the Court put it, 
it appears that Vermont could supply academic organizations
with prescriber-identifying information to use in countering the
messages of brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers and in
promoting the prescription of generic drugs. But § 4631(d) leaves
detailers no means of purchasing, acquiring, or using prescriber-
identifying information. The law on its face burdens disfavored
speech by disfavored speakers.86
Because the law banned the use of data for speech by the marketers,
but allowed it for speech by their political opponents, it discrimi-
nated on the basis of viewpoint and was thus unconstitutional.87
Such a conclusion is a straightforward application of basic free-
speech law—the government cannot tell human speakers what
arguments they can and cannot make, and what data they can and
cannot rely on. The government also cannot discriminate between
speakers, letting some but not others rely on a particular piece of
information.
The second significant element of the opinion in Sorrell was a sug-
gestion that the sale of a database was somehow speech protected
by the First Amendment.88 Vermont had made the argument that
the Prescription Confidentiality Act did not regulate speech, but
merely conduct: the sale of information as a commodity.89 The First
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663-64 (2011) (citing R.A.V., 505 U.S. at
391).
86. Id. at 2663.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 2667.
89. Id.
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Circuit in the New Hampshire case had upheld New Hampshire’s
antidetailing law on this exact basis.90 As the Sorrell Court held:
This Court has held that the creation and dissemination of
information are speech within the meaning of the First Amend-
ment.... Facts, after all, are the beginning point for much of the
speech that is most essential to advance human knowledge and
to conduct human affairs. There is thus a strong argument that
prescriber-identifying information is speech for First Amend-
ment purposes.91
Although the Court hinted that the sale of a database might be
speech, the Court stopped short of that sweeping conclusion because
the regulation’s discrimination against marketers was a content-
and viewpoint-based restriction.92 In this respect, the Court con-
tinued its tradition of moving carefully and slowly in cases involving
a conflict between privacy rules and freedom of speech. And it most
certainly did not hold that government regulation of databases and
marketing based upon data analytics is equivalent to government
regulation of the content of the news.
III. WHAT SORRELL MEANS
What is the significance of Sorrell for data privacy law? The short
answer is that it is not clear because the opinion itself was not clear.
From a First Amendment perspective, the Vermont statute was
clumsily drafted, but the Court’s opinion was hardly a model of
clarity either. Moreover, Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan
would have upheld the Prescription Confidentiality Act notwith-
standing its poor drafting, on the ground that the law was merely
lawful regulation of a commercial enterprise and threatened the
First Amendment barely, if at all.93
Nevertheless, some observers have suggested that Sorrell might
mean the end of privacy law, because it assumed that data flows are
90. IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 52 (1st Cir. 2008), abrogated by Sorrell, 131
S. Ct. 2653.
91. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2667 (citations omitted).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2673 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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speech.94 These scholars argue that the inevitable result of this
conclusion is that all laws regulating the flows of data are now
constitutionally suspect.95 Ashutosh Bhagwat worries that “the
Court’s hints in this regard have dramatic, and extremely troubling,
implications for a broad range of existing and proposed rules that
seek to control disclosure of personal information in order to protect
privacy.”96 More enthusiastically, Jane Bambauer argues that “for
all practical purposes, and in every context relevant to the current
debates in information law, data is speech. Privacy regulations are
rarely incidental burdens to knowledge. Instead, they are deliber-
ately designed to disrupt knowledge creation.”97 In their readings of
Sorrell, these scholars echo the earlier claim of Eugene Volokh that
data privacy law under the FIPs is no more than “a right to have the
government stop you from speaking about me.”98
If this interpretation became the law, the implications would be
striking: information privacy law as we know it would be dead. If
data were speech, every restriction on the disclosure—not to
mention the collection or use—of information would face heightened
First Amendment scrutiny, and would be presumptively unconstitu-
tional. This would jeopardize not just medical privacy rules, but
most likely financial privacy rules, reader privacy rules, and any
hope of imposing the FIPs to Internet data such as the logs Internet
service providers and marketers keep of which websites we visit.
Arguably, even such venerable nondisclosure rules as the attorney-
client duty of confidentiality would also have to satisfy the demands
of heightened First Amendment scrutiny, for these rules also place
nondisclosure obligations on lawyers not to speak confidences.
This reading of Sorrell has some support in dictum in Justice
Kennedy’s opinion, which suggested that regulation of information
flows was indistinguishable from regulating speech.99 But even
Justice Kennedy was careful to make clear that the holding in
Sorrell did not render privacy law unconstitutional in general.100 In
94. See id. at 2663 (majority opinion).
95. See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Details, Detailing, and the Death
of Privacy, 36 VT. L. REV. 855, 855 (2012).
96. Id. at 856.
97. Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 63 (2014).
98. Volokh, supra note 12, at 1051.
99. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2665.
100. Id. at 2668.
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particular, he suggested that if Vermont had addressed doctor
confidentiality “through a more coherent policy” like the federal
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,101 rath-
er than (in his view) the haphazard methods it had used, the law
would have been constitutional.102
There is thus another reading of both Sorrell and First Amend-
ment law that is less menacing to data privacy law and to the FIPs.
Under this reading, the problem with the Vermont law was not that
it regulated data flows, but that it imposed viewpoint restrictions on
unprotected speech. In other words, Sorrell is not the beginning of
the end for data privacy law. Instead, like R.A.V., the case is a re-
minder that the government cannot impose viewpoint restraints on
particular speakers, like marketers.103 Under this view, Sorrell
invalidated one particularly clumsy attempt to regulate marketing,
but it does not follow from this that data privacy law is largely
unconstitutional. In fact, as Justice Kennedy suggested, the statute
would have been less problematic if it had imposed greater duties of
confidentiality on the data, rather than just restricting marketing
uses.104 This would be the case because “[p]rivacy is a concept too in-
tegral to the person and a right too essential to freedom to allow its
manipulation to support just those ideas the government prefers.”105
I think that this narrower reading of Sorrell is the better one, but
ultimately Sorrell is just one case with a poorly explained holding.
Yet the case raises broader questions of how much force the First
Amendment should play in the regulation of data privacy. Is the
trade in personal data commercial regulation of the sort that does
not and should not concern free expression doctrine? Or, as some
commentators believe, is data speech? In the next two Sections of
this Article, I want to show why asking “is data speech?” is a poor
way to ask a very important question. I will also argue that however
we frame the question, subjecting general nondisclosure rules on
commercial data flows to the full force of the First Amendment
would be a very bad idea. In fact, doing so would uproot one of the
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 (2012); 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2013).
102. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2668. 
103. See generally R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
104. Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2668.
105. Id. at 2672.
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most basic foundations on which modern constitutional law has
been built.
IV. THE SILLINESS OF “DATA=SPEECH”
The “data-is-speech” argument has a certain superficial appeal.
After all, if the First Amendment is about protecting people's ability
to share ideas and information, and data is information, then the
First Amendment should protect people's ability to share data. The
argument is clear, and it is consistent—everything is speech, and
everything is protected.
But this argument's consistency is a foolish consistency. Just
because something is speech does not mean it is beyond regulation.
Nor does the fact that something is labeled speech qualify it for
special protection under the First Amendment. Consider once more
the wide variety of activities humans do every day with words—we
talk on the phone, write books, emails, and blogs, and sing in the
shower. People also use words to hire assassins, engage in insider
trading, sexually harass subordinates in the workplace, and verbal-
ly abuse their children. All of these activities are speech, but many
of them are well outside the main concerns of the First Amendment.
We need to protect some, but we need to regulate others. This is a
problem.
The good news is that this kind of problem is one that the law is
used to dealing with. Other areas of constitutional law face the
same problem. Take, for example, the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, which bars the government from
denying any person “the equal protection of the laws.”106 A superfi-
cial reading of these words would be that the government cannot
treat people differently, because to do so would deny them “the
equal protection of the laws.”107 Like the data-is-speech argument,
this interpretation would have consistency, but it would be a foolish
consistency. Governments treat their citizens differently all the
time: they discriminate on the basis of age when allocating driver's
licenses and health benefits like Medicare; they discriminate on the
basis of wealth when setting tax rates, college financial aid, and
106. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
107. Id.
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welfare benefits; they discriminate on the basis of education and
ability when allocating law and medical licenses; and they discrimi-
nate on the basis of criminal activity when deciding who can be free
and who goes to prison. All of these actions discriminate, but none
of them bring down the full weight of the Equal Protection Clause.
As long as they are rational, these laws are constitutional. And that
is a good thing, because a government that cannot treat people
differently for a good reason cannot regulate for the common good.
Of course, treating people differently for a bad reason can be
dangerous. To remedy this problem, equal protection law long ago
created the idea of a suspect classification: the government is al-
lowed to discriminate among its citizens in lots of ways, but certain
kinds of discrimination—classifications on the basis of race, gender,
and national origin, for instance—are suspect.108 When the govern-
ment uses race to discriminate, we become suspicious, and judges
scrutinize the laws much more carefully.109 This is why Jim Crow
laws are unconstitutional and why even benign forms of discrimina-
tion like affirmative action must be carefully justified.110 For these
laws to be constitutional they must be narrowly tailored to a
compelling government interest.111 
But because a small subset of suspect classifications is treated
differently, the rest of the law can function. For example, the state
can deny driver’s licenses, tattoos, and beer to fifteen-year-olds. As
long as these laws are rationally related to a legitimate government
purpose, they are constitutional.112 There are certainly hard cases
at the margins, but they are relegated to those margins. In the
main, equal protection law has chosen common sense over a foolish
consistency that would require courts to scrutinize every portion of
every law that treats people differently.
To put the point succinctly, discrimination is everywhere, but only
those few kinds of discrimination that are especially dangerous get
a hard look under the Equal Protection Clause.113 All discrimination
108. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 530-35 (7th ed. 2013).
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 687 (4th ed. 2011).
112. See id.
113. See id.
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implicates the Equal Protection Clause, but most kinds get only a
cursory glance from courts. And the system works.
Something similar goes on in First Amendment law, although it
does not get recognized as frequently.114 Speech is everywhere, and
it is regulated all the time, but only certain kinds of speech
restrictions that are especially dangerous get looked at under the
full force of the First Amendment.115 There are, of course, the
famous categories of unprotected speech—incitement, obscenity,
fighting words, threats, falsely shouting fire in theatres, and so
forth.116 But these are just the tip of the iceberg. Under the surface,
beneath our normal attention, there are product labeling require-
ments, murder-for-hire contracts, securities disclosures and non-
disclosures, insider trading rules, agreements to restrain trade,
sexually harassing speech that creates a hostile environment in the
workplace, and regulations of truthful but misleading commercial
offers.117 Frederick Schauer has called this idea “constitutional
salience”—we are so used to regulations of words and information
outside the normal attention of First Amendment law that we often
do not notice them.118 They are not salient, so we do not notice them
even though they are hiding in plain sight. And the system works.
Faced with a similar choice between foolish consistency and com-
mon sense,  judges and scholars have overwhelmingly chosen the
latter. The First Amendment has never been interpreted as an
absolute protection for all uses of words, much less for automated
and mechanized data flows or the sale of information as a commod-
ity.119 American lawyers are perhaps the group most protective of
free speech in the history of the world.120 But even in the United
States, virtually all strong, speech-protective interpretations of the
First Amendment carve out large chunks of the ways we use words
114. See Richards, supra note 10, at 1168-81; Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the
First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV.
1765, 1769 (2004).
115. See Schauer, supra note 114, at 1769.
116. See id. at 1768.
117. See id. at 1805 (providing examples).
118. See id. at 1768.
119. See, e.g., id. at 1769.
120. See, e.g., RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN CROSS-CULTURAL
PERSPECTIVE 12-25 (2006).
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or information from heightened First Amendment protection.121 This
is so the First Amendment can do its job—protecting political and
artistic expression—without swallowing the rest of the law. 
From this perspective, we can see why asking whether data is
speech is the wrong question. What matters is not the “speechiness”
of a category of human activity as much as the purpose and effects
of the government regulation at issue. Commercial data flows are
certainly within the outermost bounds of the First Amendment, but
so too are sexual harassment, criminal and antitrust contracting,
threats, and securities disclosures. Putting data flows in this
category merely means that the government can regulate them if it
acts rationally to further a legitimate government purpose. Some-
thing more is needed to show that regulation of commercial data
flows is suspect like regulation of traditional categories of expres-
sion such as political speech or protest, commentary on matters of
public concern, artistic expression, or, less importantly, advertising
to consumers that proposes a commercial transaction.122
One might ask a very good question at this point: Why is all
speech, broadly defined, not protected by the First Amendment? Let
me offer two answers to this question, one simple and one more
complicated. The simple answer is that because First Amendment
lawyers do not want to leave important expressive activities or
practices out of the First Amendment’s protection, we tend to define
speech rather broadly. For example, the Supreme Court has held a
vast amount of things to be speech—or at least within the protection
of the First Amendment—including cross burning, swearing, nude
dancing, virtual child pornography, threats, lies, and horrifying
discrimination and hate speech.123 Often, this is done for good
121. Id.
122. For cases about the regulation of political expression, see, for example, Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971); and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 292
(1964). For cases about the regulation of artistic expression, see, for example, Brown v.
Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2742 (2011); and Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S.
495, 506 (1952). For cases about the regulation of advertising, see, for example, Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 571 (2001); and Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 571-72 (1980).
123. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551 (2012) (holding lies to be
speech); Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220-21 (2011) (holding hate speech to be speech);
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 585-86 (2002) (holding virtual child pornography to be
speech); Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 661 (2000) (holding discriminatory speech
as within the First Amendment’s protection); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396
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reason, to protect potentially valuable dissenting political speech
from the tyranny of the majority. But notice that when we expand
the outermost bounds of what is speech, there is a risk that every-
thing becomes expressive or potentially expressive. The more this
happens, the less room we have for ordinary legal rules, even ones
that have no purpose or even effect of political or artistic censorship.
All speech is not protected by the First Amendment because if we
define “speech” broadly enough, the First Amendment would swal-
low the law, making ordinary regulation impossible.
This brings us to the more complicated answer, which has to do
with a basic tension in constitutional law. Constitutional rights are
protected by judges setting aside laws passed by the democratic
process. Alexander Bickel famously called this the “counter-majori-
tarian difficulty”: it is undemocratic for unelected judges to strike
down laws passed by our elected representatives.124 Judicial inter-
vention is justified when it invalidates restrictions on free speech,
voting, or political equality, because without such safeguards, we
have reason to distrust all laws. If we cannot speak out about unfair
laws, it is hard to call those laws democratic. But the countermajori-
tarian difficulty also suggests that exceptions to the basic idea that
democratic laws are the law of the land must be limited.125 If judges
made all of the law, we would no longer be living in a representative
democracy, but in an oligarchy at best. Modern American constitu-
tional law rests on the necessary compromise between democratic
laws and undemocratic protection of civil liberties. For the system
to work, it relies on the undemocratic exceptions being limited, and
on those exceptions protecting democratic rights, like free speech.
Central to this compromise is an important lesson from almost a
century ago, to which we now turn.
(1992) (holding cross burning to be speech); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 572
(1991) (holding nude dancing as protected within the First Amendment); Schad v. Mt.
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 76-77 (1981) (holding nude dancing as protected); Cohen, 403 U.S. at
15 (holding swearing as protected speech); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 278 (1941)
(holding threats as protected speech).
124. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (1962).
125. See id. at 16-17.
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V. REJECTING DIGITAL LOCHNER
There is a famous parable in constitutional law that has been
taught to virtually every first-year law student for decades. In the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Industrial Revo-
lution transformed American society. On the one hand, it produced
great fortunes and technological innovation that made what had
been impossible commonplace. These new innovations included
factories, steam engines, railroads, cars, airplanes, and cheap
textiles, and they shaped the modern world into a form that we—or
at least our parents—could recognize. On the other hand, the
Industrial Revolution produced enormous social costs, including
huge wealth inequality, poverty, child labor, unsafe industrial
working conditions, and pollution. Faced with these problems,
Congress and the state legislatures tried to fix the problems of the
perilous industrial workplace while preserving its benefits. Progres-
sive legislators passed laws preventing child labor, regulating
unsafe working conditions, and imposing minimum wage and
maximum hours laws, overtime requirements, product labeling
laws, and antitrust laws.126 But the Supreme Court struck many of
these laws down as infringements on personal liberty.127 Afraid that
laws regulating economic transactions could lead to wealth redistri-
bution or socialism, the Court held that much of this economic
regulation violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause, infringing on the rights of workers and employers to what
it called the “liberty of contract.”128
This era in Supreme Court history is named after the infamous
1905 case of Lochner v. New York. In Lochner, the Supreme Court
struck down a New York law regulating the safety of bakers.129
Lochner was not the first Supreme Court case to protect economic
rights against government regulation, nor was it the last, but it was
the case that gave its name to the era of strong constitutional
protection of economic rights, lasting from the late nineteenth
126. See Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three:
The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383, 1392 (2001).
127. G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 241-42 (2000).
128. Id.
129. 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).
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century until the late 1930s.130 The Lochner Court’s economic liber-
tarianism rested on the idea that private property was the bulwark
of political liberty, and that a government that has the power to
redistribute wealth is a grave threat to liberty.131 These ideas have
a strong tradition in Anglo-American political thought, but there
was a problem. A broad government power to regulate economic
matters also allows regulations such as minimum wages, maximum
hours, workplace safety, and the right to collective bargaining.
During the Industrial Revolution, the conservative economic,
libertarian view of the Constitution became inconsistent with the
needs of a modern, industrial economy.132 This inconsistency became
most apparent during the Great Depression, when Lochner-style
doctrines were used to invalidate portions of the New Deal.133 Thus,
in the industrial era, a libertarian view of industrial economic
liberty made needed regulation impossible.
I fear that acceptance of the data-is-speech argument will repeat
these errors of the Industrial Age for the Information Age. Today,
great chunks of human society are being transformed into digital
form, and we all leave digital footprints every day as we live our
lives. It is essential that we preserve strong civil liberties in our
digital future. But if the lessons of the twentieth century are that
government regulation is sometimes necessary in an industrial
economy, we should not forget those lessons in our information
economy. In a 2005 article published before the Sorrell litigation, I
made an early argument along these lines.134 Justice Breyer made
a similar point in his Sorrell dissent: “At best the Court opens a
Pandora's Box of First Amendment challenges to many ordinary
regulatory practices that may only incidentally affect a commercial
message. At worst, it reawakens Lochner’s pre-New Deal threat of
substituting judicial for democratic decisionmaking where ordinary
economic regulation is at issue.”135 The many new uses to which we
130. BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT (1998).
131. Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It was Decided”: Lochner and Constitutional
Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 687-88 (2005).
132. Id. at 704.
133. Id. at 684.
134. Richards, supra note 10, at 1211-21. I should disclose that I gave pro bono counsel to
the State of Vermont during the Sorrell litigation.
135. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2685 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted).
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can put data create new possibilities, but also new problems. We
need to make choices as a society about what kinds of data privacy
rules we should have, and about when data should flow freely. In
fact, we might ultimately decide that the best policy is to have very
little data privacy. 
But, however we as a society choose to regulate data flows, we
must be able to choose. We must not be sidetracked by misleading
First Amendment arguments, because the costs of not regulating
the trade in commercial data are significant. As we enter the
Information Age, in which the trade in information is a multibillion-
dollar industry, the government should be able to regulate the huge
flows of personal information, as well as the permissible uses of
such information. If our lives become digital, but data is speech,
regulation of many kinds of social problems will become impossible.
There will certainly be cases at the borders of strong First Amend-
ment because, of course, data will be sometimes tied to important
expression. But this is an insufficient reason to give up on regula-
tion of our society as it digitizes. At the dawn of the Industrial Age,
business interests persuaded the Supreme Court in Lochner and
similar cases that the freedom of contract should immunize them
from regulation. We must reject the similar calls of modern
advocates for digital Lochner.
CONCLUSION: 
THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN AND INFORMATION POLICY
Let me conclude with a few thoughts about the right to be
forgotten. I have argued that most commercial data flows regulated
by information privacy law embodying the FIPs should be constitu-
tional, but what about the right to be forgotten? The answer to this
question is more complicated, because the right to be forgotten is a
poorly defined idea that can mean several different things.136 But
the ambiguity of the right to be forgotten is a helpful point on which
to end this Article, because it illustrates my general argument: ord-
inary commercial regulations of the data trade are constitutional,
but tort rights to censor the media are not. 
136. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
1532 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:1501
At the most basic level, the general encouragement that personal
data should be deleted at some point poses no constitutional prob-
lems. Our digital society cannot be regulated by legal rules alone,
and the development of professional norms among data holders to
protect values like the FIPs or some variant of the right to be forgot-
ten will be an important part of any solution. This is particularly
the case for so-called sensitive data—information that would be
particularly harmful if disclosed, such as financial, health, or politi-
cal data. Governments could promote the importance of this social
norm without mandating it, which would be clearly constitutional.
We could also imagine governments imposing the right to be
forgotten on certain data holders as a consequence of their relation-
ship with users who supply them with data. For example, imagine
a regulation of social networking sites that would require sites like
Facebook to allow users to edit information they have supplied to
the company, like status updates or contact information.137 This
would be a more substantial requirement than merely promoting
social norms, but it should also be constitutional as an ordinary
regulation of a commercial relationship. Such rules could also be
justified as placing an implied use condition on the receipt of
information, the way the law imposes nondisclosure and other use
conditions on the information that lawyers receive from their
clients. The Fair Credit Reporting Act already gives consumers the
ability to correct false information in their credit reports and places
limits on the ability of credit reporting agencies to disclose old
information about consumers (such as arrest records and lawsuits
older than seven years).138 At least when there is an equivalently
important relationship between consumers and data brokers, such
regulations should be constitutional in most cases.
On the other hand, the right to be forgotten runs into First
Amendment problems when it starts to resemble the old disclosure
tort. In fact, the proposal has generated so much free-speech con-
cern because the versions of the right proposed for the revisions to
the European Union Directive have taken the tort form. The pro-
posed regulation would allow people to require any Internet service
137. Of course, most sites, including Facebook already provide this feature, though the law
does not require it.
138. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681c-1681i (2012).
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provider to delete data about them if there is no legitimate reason
to keep it.139 This is a much more sweeping version of the right,
which would allow the deletion of potentially newsworthy informa-
tion about a person provided by others.140 It is one thing to give an
Internet user the ability to restrict or retract information he or she
provides in the context of a commercial relationship, and quite
another to allow a person the right to edit any and all information
about them on the Internet. Such a broad power would turn the
Internet into our own personal Wikipedias and would represent a
resuscitation of Mabel Warren’s broad right to censor not merely
commercial data, but potentially highly newsworthy expression as
well.
The fact that this strong form of the right to be forgotten is a
threat to free speech does not mean that milder forms of a right to
delete are also problematic. Some of these weaker forms of the right
might be a bad idea in theory or in actual implementation; they
might increase costs, or deter innovations, or be counterproductive.
But, they are probably constitutional. Not everything that is a bad
idea is unconstitutional, and in a democratic society in a time of
technological change, we must be free to make policy mistakes.
General principles or rights to make data mortal do not threaten
free public debate or democratic self-government. One could imagine
a right to be forgotten that is bad policy, but in a democratic society,
the basic contours of information policy must ultimately be up to the
people, not unelected judges. Making policy mistakes is sometimes
a price we pay for self-government.
139. Press Release, Eur. Comm’n, supra note 31.
140. See CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., supra note 35.
       
